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Running Title: Executives’ Pay-Performance Link in China 
Executives’ Pay-Performance Link in China: Role of Independent and Gender Diverse Compensation 
Committees 
Abstract 
Purpose: In this paper, we investigate whether an independent and gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens 
the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance in Chinese companies. We also investigate whether the 
independent compensation committee composed of all male directors is effective in designing the optimal contract for 
executives.   
Methodology: We use data from A-share listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2005 to 
2015. As a baseline methodology, we use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression to draw inferences. In addition, 
cluster OLS regression, two-stage least square regression, the two-stage Heckman test, and the propensity score matching 
method are also used to control for endogeneity issues. 
Results: We find evidence that an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the link between 
top managers’ pay and firm performance; that the presence of a woman on the compensation committee enhances the 
positive influence of committee independence on this relationship; that a compensation committee’s independence or 
gender diversity are more effective in designing top managers’ compensation in legal-person controlled firms than they 
are in state-controlled firms; that gender diversity on the compensation committee is negatively associated with top 
managers’ total pay; and that an independent compensation committee pays top managers more.  
Practice Implications:  Our results highlight the role of an independent compensation committee in designing optimal 
contracts for top managers. We provide empirical evidence that a woman on the compensation committee strengthens its 
objectivity in determining top managers’ compensation. Our finding supports regulatory bodies’ recommendations 
regarding independent and women directors.  
Social implications: Our findings contribute to the recent debate about gender equality around the globe. Given the 
discrimination against women, many regulatory bodies mandate a quota for women on corporate boards. Our study 
findings support the regulatory bodies’ recommendations by highlighting the economic benefit of having women in top 
management positions. 
Originality: This study contributes to literature by investigating the largely overlooked questions of whether having a 
gender-diverse or independent compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance; whether an independent compensation committee is more efficient in setting executives’ pay when it is 
gender-diverse; and whether the effect of independent directors and female directors on top managers’ compensation 
varies based on the firm’s ownership structure. Overall, the main contribution of the study is that we provide robust 
empirical evidence in support of the managerial power axiom.  
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1. Introduction: 
The recent stratospheric increase in top management’s compensation has attracted the attention of legislators, the media, 
and academics alike (e.g., Murphy 2012). Excessive compensation (e.g., Core et al. 2008; Bugeja et al. 2016), little or no 
relationship between compensation and firm performance (Gigliotti 2013; Usman et al. 2015), and the downward 
stickiness of compensation (e.g., Kim et al. 2017) have led to significant negative attention. Managerial power theory 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 2004, 2006) as it relates to managerial compensation has become a popular 
viewpoint among researchers and regulatory bodies. This theory proposes that managerial power over the board or the 
compensation committee leads to rent-extracting activities like increased compensation and no relationship or a weak 
relationship between pay and firm performance (See Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 2004, 2006). However, 
the proponents of optimal contracting theory recognize that the interests of the managers and owners often do not 
converge, and seek to settle this issue by providing the incentive compensation that results in a stronger relationship 
between top managers’ pay and firm performance. The optimal contracting theory proposes that boards of directors 
engage in arms-length bargaining with top managers to design contracts for top managers that can reduce agency issues. 
However, there is ample evidence that this process is broken because board members and compensation committee 
members face social, psychological and political pressure in decision-making (Devers et al. 2007; Finkelstein et al. 2009). 
Therefore, the managerial power theory is more popular now than optimal contracting theory. Fundamentally, the 
managerial power theory deepens the optimal contracting theory’s assumptions by providing the managerial power 
argument as a reason for boards’ failure to find optimal contracts (Van Essen et al. 2015). 
The proponents of managerial power theory contend that an independent board or compensation committee facilitates 
arms-length transactions and leads to the objective determination of top managers' compensation. Therefore, one of the 
hallmarks of the code of best corporate governance around the globe (e.g., the Chinese Securities Regulation Committee 
in China) is the requirement for independent directors who are not under the influence of hiring managers. Independent 
board and compensation committees are considered essential for sound internal governance in general and particularly for 
top managers’ optimal contracting, but this prescription has not been validated empirically (See Capezio et al. 2011). The 
majority of previous studies have reported no influence or a positive influence of compensation committee independence 
on CEO pay and no influence on the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance (See, e.g., Main & Johnston 
1993; Anderson & Bizjak 2003; Capezio et al. 2011; Gregory & Smith 2012; Conyon, 2014). Similarly, few existing 
studies in the context of China report that neither the compensation committee presence nor the independence limits the 
CEO pay or strengthen the CEO pay-performance link (e.g. Zhu et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2011 & 
2012; Luo and Jackson, 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Usman et al., 2018) except few (e.g., Luo, 2015). However, a common 
limitation of the most studies conducted in the Chinese context is that they only focus on the association between the 
presence of compensation committee and CEO pay (e.g.,; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2011 & 2012; Luo and 
Jackson, 2012; Chen et al., 2014) rather than the association between compensation committee structure and executives 
pay (e.g., Zhu et al., 2009; Usman et al., 2018). Therefore, we revisit the question concerning whether or not an 
independent compensation committee limits the top managers’ total compensation, and strengthens the relationship 
between top managers pay and firm performance in China.  
Another issue that has arisen concerns women directors on the board. Policymakers and legislators around the world 
market are encouraging the representation of women on the board through persuasion and/or legislative quotas. For 
example, Terjesen et al. (2016) documented that sixteen countries’ codes of corporate governance encourage female 
representation on boards (e.g., Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Pakistan), while in fourteen countries 
female representation on boards is mandatory for publically listed companies and state-owned firms (e.g., Belgium, 
France, India, Italy, Norway, Spain). Even in other countries, the proportion of females on boards is increasing. For 
example, in the US the proportion of females rose from 5.6 percent in 1990 to 12.3 percent in 1999 (Farrell & Hersch 
2005) and to 16.9 percent in 2014 (Catalyst Census 2014). In China, the proportion of female directors is also increasing, 
rising from 9.1 percent in 2005 to 14.0 percent in 2015 (See Table 2). 
Given the increased attention to the issue of female directors from legislators around the globe, several studies have 
investigated whether female directors affect boards’ efficiency and their committees’ functioning (e.g., Adams & Ferreira 
2009; Nielsen & Huse 2010; Aldamen et al. 2016; Bugeja et al. 2016). However, the question concerning whether the 
presence of woman on compensation committees facilitates the objective determination of top managers’ compensation 
has been overlooked by previous studies, with the few exceptions (e.g., Bugeja et al., 2016; Strobl et al., 2016; Usman et 
al., 2018). However, the findings of these limited studies were inconsistent. For example Usman et al., (2018) and Bugeja 
et al. (2016) reported that the gender diverse compensation committee limits the CEO pay, while Strobl et al. (2016) did 
not find such evidence. Given the inconsistent findings and paucity of studies in this emerging field, the second objective 
of this study is to determine whether a gender-diverse compensation committee limits top managers’ total compensation 
and strengthens the relationship between their pay and firm performance. 
Despite increased attention from legislators, practitioners, and academics, researchers have failed to recognize the role of 
compensation committee independence in a gender-diversity framework, so we wonder whether we can be confident that 
an independent compensation committee composed of all male directors is independent of hired managers. Therefore, our 
third objective is to determine whether the impact of compensation committee independence on executives’ total pay and 
on the link between pay and firm performance is more pronounced when the compensation committee has female 
directors. 
We make three substantial conceptual and empirical contributions by extending the literature in three ways. First, the main 
contribution of the study is that, we provide robust empirical evidence in support of the managerial power axiom 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 2004, 2006). We reconcile inconclusive results on whether an independent 
compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance link (e.g., 
Newman & Mozes  1999; Capezio et al. 2011; Kent et al. 2016) by first time considering the conditions under which 
independent compensation committee is effective in reinforcing this link. Thus, we contribute to the literature by 
considering and providing first evidence that an independent compensation committee is efficient in setting executives’ 
pay when it is gender-diverse than when it is not.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence from an emerging economy (China). Like 
other emerging economies, the Chinese market is less developed than many Western countries. Many economists have 
suggested that the markets and organizations of developed and developing countries have basic structural and institutional 
differences that limit the generalizability of findings from the research to developing economies (Ghosh, 2006). 
According to Fan et al. (2011), knowledge about how executives in developing markets are being compensated and 
promoted is limited. Therefore, we choose China, the world’s largest developing economy and the second-largest 
economy, thereby adding to the limited but growing literature investigating the role of compensation committee structure 
on executives pay outside of the developed economies.  
China’s listed firms have a unique institutional background that may influence decisions related to executives’ pay 
contracts. For instance, in China the concentrated ownership is apparent and investor protection and governance structures 
are weaker than the developed countries. The real controlling power in the majority of companies lies with the state or the 
legal individual owners. These governance and institutional differences may affect the compensation committee’s 
efficiency and their decisions about top management’s compensation. Therefore, we consider the unique Chinese 
institutional factors while examining the governance role of independent and gender diverse compensation committees on 
designing the compensation contracts of top management, because the researchers argue that the most promising 
governance research should focus on understanding the institutional context in which the governance occurs (e.g. Davis, 
2005). However, executive compensation and corporate governance literature generally overlook the within country 
institutional factors, focusing instead on behavioral perspectives and economic theories (Judge et al., 2008). Similarly, the 
boardroom gender diversity literature ignores institutional factors when exploring the effect of gender diversity on firm 
governance or performance. There are few studies which consider the effect of cross-country institutional contingencies 
on firm governance (e.g. Van Essen et al., 2012, 2013). Therefore, the researchers have suggested that top managers’ pay 
varies from country to country because of the differences in their institutional backgrounds, such as ownership structures, 
governance structures, and regulatory frameworks (e.g., Conyon & Murphy 2000). The general conclusion of these 
studies is that different institutional contingencies (for example corporate governance codes, legal systems, and 
government rules and regulations) influence the cross-country differences in corporate governance and CEO 
compensation designs (Usman et al., 2018). We complement these studies by exploring how within country institutional 
factors influence the governance role of independent and female directors in setting the executives’ pay contracts. Thus, 
we contribute to institutional theory by providing novel insight to the existing literature by showing that the effect of 
independent and female directors on top managers’ compensation varies by the type of ownership.  
Third, we contribute toward the limited literature on gender diverse compensation committees and CEO pay (e.g. Bugeja 
et al., 2016; Strobl et al., 2016) by not only investigating the effect of a gender diverse compensation committee on top 
managers total pay, but also on top managers’ pay-performance link (Usman et al., 2018). In addition, we contribute to the 
literature by focusing on top management team compensation rather than focusing only on CEO pay, because a majority 
of previous studies on executive compensation only focused on CEO pay (e.g., Gregory & Smith 2012; Conyon2014; 
Bugeja et al., 2016; Strobl et al., 2016 Usman et al., 2018). However, in our robustness test we also investigated the effect 
of independent and gender diverse compensation committees on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link.    
Fourth, the significance of our study stretches beyond bridging this gap because we provide empirical evidence on two 
trends in the world market that encourage or require an independent compensation committee and female presence on the 
board. Because of this attention, it is imperative to investigate the role of independent directors and female directors on 
internal governance processes at the board and subcommittees levels.  
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
Traditional agency theory posits that firms’ owners should offer performance–based compensation to their agents while 
gauging the degree to which firm performance is sensitive to compensation (Hartzell & Starks 2003; Schultz et al. 2013). 
Of course, owners do not set their top managements’ compensation directly; instead, the board of directors delegates its 
compensation committee to do so on the shareholders’ behalf. Therefore, it is the compensation committee’s 
responsibility to engage in arm’s-length bargaining with top managers regarding their pay and to design optimal contracts 
independently that can reduce agency issues. In contrast to agency theory, managerial power theory argues that boards of 
directors often fail to engage in arm’s-length bargaining because of social, political, and psychological influences (Devers 
et al. 2007; Finkelstein et al. 2009) and that they may act in favor of top managers because of their managerial power. In 
line with the managerial power theory, several studies have found that managers receive more pay when they are powerful 
(e.g., Abed et al. 2014; Van Essen et al. 2015). Therefore, proponents of the managerial power theory contend that 
structural arrangements for the board and the compensation committee are essential in order to improve internal 
monitoring and the design of optimal contracts for top managers. For example, a compensation committee that is 
dominated by executive directors can dilute the committee’s independence and lead to ineffective decision-making 
regarding top managements’ compensation contracts. Therefore, code of best corporate governance around the globe 
recommends that companies’ compensation committees be dominated by independent directors (e.g., CSRC 2005). In line 
with this prescription, Kent et al. (2016) documented that an independent compensation committee strengthens the 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, but most other studies do not support this prescription (e.g., 
Conyon1997; Newman & Mozes 1999; Capezio et al. 2011). Therefore, we reinvestigate this issue, expecting that such 
independence not only restricts top managers’ total pay but also strengthens the link between their pay and firm 
performance. We hypothesize: 
H1: An independent compensation committee is negatively associated with top managers’ total compensation. 
H2: An independent compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance. 
Another feature of the compensation committee’s composition is gender diversity, which has been overlooked by the 
literature. However, the research on corporate boards’ gender diversity and firm performance is growing. The published 
limited studies on compensation committees’ gender diversity and CEO pay does not explicitly develop the theoretical 
framework (See Bugeja et al., 2016; Strobl et al., 2016; Usman et al., 2018) Therefore, we focus on three theoretical 
approaches—traditional agency theory, managerial power theory, and stakeholder theory—to associate gender diversity 
on compensation committees with top managers’ pay.  
Traditional agency theory is the theory researchers’ use most commonly to justify how gender diversity can contribute to 
boards’ effectiveness and firm performance (Terjesen et al. 2009). This theory suggests that the board of directors play a 
critical monitoring and controlling role to address agency issues (Fama & Jensen 1983; Reguera-Alvarado et al. 2017). 
One of the prevailing assumptions of this theory is that the board’s independent directors will act independently from the 
executive directors to safeguard the shareholders’ interest. Studies on the association between gender diversity on the 
corporate board and corporate governance have found that gender diversity in the boardroom improves the board’s 
independence (Carter et al. 2010). For example, Adams & Ferreira (2009) argued that female directors improve the 
board’s monitoring because they are not in the “old boys club.” The authors also found that female directors improve male 
directors’ attendance, that women participate more in monitoring than male directors do, that a female presence on the 
board increases the sensitivity of CEO turnover to stock returns, and that female directors demand more audit efforts. 
Other studies have found that a high proportion of women directors on the board improve strategic control (Nielsen & Hus 
2010) and earnings quality (Srinidhi et al. 2011). To summarize, women directors are tough monitors (Adams & Ferreira 
2009), increase the board’s independence (Carter et al. 2010; Lucas- Pérez et al. 2015), reduce costs associated with 
agency issues (Reguera-Alvarado et al. 2017), and improve the corporate governance processes (Hillman et al. 2002; 
Adams & Ferreira 2009). It stands to reason, then, that a woman on the compensation committee will improve the 
committee’s effectiveness and increase the likelihood that the committee will tie top managements’ compensation to firm 
performance.  
The proponents of managerial power theory argue that an independent board or compensation committee increases the 
likelihood that top managers’ compensation will be determined objectively (See Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 
2003, 2004, 2006). Given the qualities of women directors, we expect that the presence of a woman on the compensation 
committee improves the committee’s independence and monitoring, thereby limiting the top managers’ power over the 
committee regarding their pay. Therefore, we expect that a gender-diverse committee is negatively associated with top 
managers’ total compensation and is positively related to the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance. 
An extension of agency theory is stakeholder theory, which proposes that the board of directors safeguards the interests of 
both shareholders and stakeholders (Freeman 1984). This approach contends that, since it is managers’ fiduciary duty to 
protect the long-term interests of all stakeholders (Evan and Freeman, 1988), the board’s composition should be adjusted 
to reflect the stakeholder’s expectations (Huse & Rindova 2001). Similarly, Hillman et al. (2001) suggested that having 
women directors on the board can help the company to understand its stakeholders and to manage its relationship with 
them. Studies have found that female directors are more sensitive to social and environmental issues (Williams 2003), so 
they can improve the company’s performance in this area, along with the firm’s reputation among its wider stakeholders 
(See Bear et al. 2010). Studies have also documented that gender diversity in the boardroom is positively associated with 
corporate social responsibility (e.g., Francoeur et al. 2008; Setó-Pamies, 2015) and that firms that are more socially 
responsible are more likely to recognize the demotivating potential of significant pay gaps between the workers and top 
management (Wade et al. 2006). Socially responsible firms are also more likely to be interested in sharing the value the 
company creates with all stakeholders, rather than only with top management (Higginson & Clough 2010). These 
arguments suggest that presence of a woman on a firm’s compensation committee will result in spending less on top 
managements’ pay, focusing instead on performance-based compensation.  
Therefore, in alignment with the agency theory, managerial power theory, and stakeholder theory, we expect that a 
gender-diverse compensation committee not only limits the CEO’s total pay but also strengthens the link between top 
managers’ pay and firm performance. We hypothesize that: 
H3: The presence of a woman on the compensation committee is negatively associated with top managers’ compensation. 
H4: The presence of a woman on the compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers’ pay 
and firm performance. 
Studies on the independence of compensation committees and executive pay have failed to decode the economic 
effectiveness of an independent compensation committee. For example, most studies have reported that an independent 
compensation committee does not limit the CEO’s compensation and does not increase the sensitivity of his or her pay to 
firm performance (See Main & Johnston1993; Anderson & Bizjak 2003; Capezio et al. 2011; Gregory & Smith 2012; 
Conyon2014). Similarly, Capezio et al. (2011) concluded their literature review by saying that the prescription to have an 
independent compensation committee is based on the faith of the regulatory bodies and is not an empirically validated 
fact. Moreover, Conyon (2014) and Kent (2016) concluded that the literature on compensation committees’ independence 
is still inconclusive. However, none of the previous studies have considered the role of compensation committee 
independence within a gender-diversity framework, so an independent compensation committee that is composed of only 
male directors may not be truly independent. For example, Terjesen et al. (2016 p. 453) observed:  
“A large board of directors with few women directors may be interpreted as being selected by the executive 
management network or as a sign that internal agents (executive officers) wield significant power over the 
selection of outside agents. … In reality, a board with a gender imbalance may be independent of the executive 
management to the same degree as a gender-diverse board, but the lack of women increases doubts from 
appointed directors, shareholders, and any stakeholders who interact with the firm regarding the board's 
independence.”  
Therefore, we expect that the influence of an independent compensation committee on top managers’ total compensation 
and on the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance will be more pronounced when there is at least 
one female director on the compensation committee. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H5: The negative effect of compensation committee independence on top managers’ total compensation is greater when 
the compensation committee is gender-diverse. 
H6: The positive effect of compensation committee independence on the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance relationship is greater when the compensation committee is gender-diverse. 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Data source and sample  
We use data from all A-share firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for a period of eleven years 
from 2005 to 2015. The study period starts in 2005 because, before this year, the Chinese Securities Regulation 
Committee (CSRC) regulations did not require firms to disclose top managers’ pay separately. Data regarding the 
variables is obtained from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Our initial sample 
was 20,271 firm-year observations. We excluded firm-years in which firms had no board compensation committee 
because our focus is on compensation committee. We also dropped firm-years for which data regarding the variables were 
missing. Thus, our final usable sample is reduced to 11,051 firm-year observations. Details about the sample are provided 
in Table 2. 
3.2. Variables 
In our study, top managers’ compensation refers to the average pay of top managers—that is, the CEO and executive 
directors. Following in the footsteps of previous studies on top management’s compensation, we use top managers’ total 
cash compensation as our dependent variable (e.g., Conyon & He 2011, 2012). Despite new CSRC (2005) regulations that 
introduced equity incentives to top management, equity compensation in China is still rare (Conyon & He 2012). To 
reduce the difference in top management’s pay across firms and the effect of heteroscedasticity, we use the log of top 
managers’ average total cash compensation. 
In alignment with previous studies, we use return on assets (ROA) to measure firm performance (e.g., Conyon 2014; Kent 
et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2017; Siddique et al., 2019). We define committee independence as the proportion of independent 
directors on the compensation committee (CIND) (e.g., Conyon & Peck 1998). We measure gender diversity on the 
compensation committee in two ways: As a dummy variable (FDUMY) that is equal to 1 if at least one woman director is 
a member of the compensation committee (and 0 otherwise) and as a continuous measure (FPRO) that is defined as the 
proportion of female directors on the compensation committee (See Bugeja et al. 2016; Usman et al., 2018). As in most of 
the literature on top management compensation, we control for corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm 
economic variables (e.g., Bugeja et al. 2016; Kent et al. 2016; Usman et al., 2018). 
Corporate governance controls include CEO role duality (CDUAL), CEO tenure (CTENUR), board size (BS), board 
independence (BI), and compensation committee size (CCS). CEO duality and CEO tenure are manifestations of 
managerial power and are positively associated with CEO compensation (Bebchuk & Fried 2004). Board size and board 
independence are included, as larger boards and independent boards can monitor top management’s actions more closely 
(See Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Daily & Schwenk 1996). Similarly, the compensation committee size is included because it is 
expected that a larger committee is more effective in setting top managers’ compensation. Ownership-structure variables 
include the percentage of the CEO’s equity holdings (CSH), the percentage of institutional shareholdings (ISH), and state-
owned enterprises (SOE). CEO equity ownership can help to alleviate agency issues (Ozkan 2007). We control for 
institutional shareholding because institutional investors are considered to be effective in monitoring top management’s 
actions, with the result that top managers have less influence over their pay (Bebchuk & Fried 2004). In line with the 
approach of Chinese scholars, we also control for state-owned enterprises (See Zhang et al. 2016). The firm economic 
variables include firm size (FS), financial leverage (FL), and book-to-market ratio (BM). A detailed description of each 
variable is given in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
3.3. Variables’ descriptive statistics 
Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for gender diversity in the 
boardroom, gender diversity on the compensation committee, and the proportion of independent directors on the 
compensation committee by year. The percentage of firms that have at least one female director on their boards increased 
from 63.3 percent in 2005 to 75.5 percent in 2015. Similarly, the average proportion of women directors increased from 
9.9 percent in 2005 to 14.0 percent in 2015. The percentage of firms with gender-diverse compensation committee was 
32.7 percent in 2005 as compared to 45.8 percent in 2015. Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all 
variables for the whole sample. The average proportion of female directors on the compensation committee in the full 
sample is 14 percent, and the average proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee in the full 
sample is 66 percent. This voluntary increase in female representation on China’s corporate boards indicates recognition 
of women’s distinct managerial skills and controlling abilities. The average board size of China’s listed firms during the 
sample period is 10.17, out of which 38 percent are independent directors. Table 3 shows the correlations between the 
variables, as the correlation coefficients between all the independent variables except gender diversity (0.883) are less 
than 0.50. Therefore, to mitigate the possibility of multicollinearity, we estimated the regression separately for each 
measure of gender diversity.  
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
3.4. Model estimation 
We first investigate the impact of an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee on top managers’ total pay 
by estimating equation 1. To determine whether an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee moderates the 
relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance, we estimate equation 2. To determine the influence of an 
independent compensation committee on top managers’ total compensation and on the relationship between top 
managers’ pay and firm performance within a gender-diversity framework, we run equations 1 and 2 for firms with and 
without gender-diverse compensation committees, respectively. Similar to previous studies on the compensation 
committee independence and gender diversity (see Newman & Mozes 1999; Bugeja et al. 2016; Kent et al. 2016), we use 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression as a baseline methodology to estimate equations (1) and (2): 
𝑇𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛 
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
𝑇𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∗ 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∗ 𝐶_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
                  ∑ 𝛽𝑛 
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,        (2) 
Where TMP is the log of the average total pay of firms’ top managers; ROA is return on assets; CIND is a proxy for an 
independent compensation committee; C_Female refers to measures of compensation committees’ gender diversity 
(FDUMY and FPRO); Controls refers to corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm economic control variables 
(CDUAL, CTENUR, BS, BI, CCS, ISH, CSH, SOE, FS, FL, and BM). A detailed description of each variable is given in 
Table 1.  
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 4 reports the results concerning the impact of an independent and a gender-diverse compensation committee on top 
managers’ total pay and on the link between top managers’ pay and firm performance. The table provides the results on 
the influence of firm performance, compensation committee independence, and gender diversity on top managers’ total 
pay. The coefficient of ROA remains positive and significant, indicating that there is a positive relationship between top 
managers pay and firm performance in Chinese firms. This result validates other studies that have also reported on this 
positive relationship (e.g., Conyon & He 2011, 2012; Zhang et al. 2016). 
The coefficient of gender diversity measures (FDUMY and FPRO) is negative and significant. These results support our 
third hypothesis, that the compensation committee’s gender diversity limits top managers’ total compensation. Bugeja et 
al. (2016) also reported a negative association between the compensation committee gender diversity and CEO 
compensation. The coefficient of compensation committee independence (CIND) remains positive and significant in the 
first two models in Table 4. This result does not support our first hypothesis, as it suggests that the independence of 
compensation committee increases the top managers’ compensation, nor does the finding support our arguments related to 
the agency theory, the managerial power theory and the effectiveness of an independent compensation committee. This 
conclusion is in line with the conclusion of other studies that have found a positive or insignificant association between 
the compensation committee’s independence and CEO’s total compensation (e.g., Main & Johnston1993; Anderson & 
Bizjak 2003; Capezio et al. 2011; Gregory & Smith 2012; Conyon 2014). However, it is too early to conclude that 
independent compensation committees are ineffective. Conclusions should be drawn only after addressing the overlooked 
question concerning whether an independent compensation committee design optimal contracts for top managers that can 
strengthen the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance? Therefore, in line with a few earlier studies 
(e.g., Conyon1997; Capezio et al. 2011; Kent et al. 2016), we investigate the influence of the compensation committee’s 
independence on the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance. 
Table 4 shows the results of our central question on whether an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee 
strengthens the link between top managers’ pay and firm performance. The interaction variable between gender diversity 
measures and firm performance (ROA_ FDUM and ROA_ FPRO) and that between the compensation committee 
independence measure and firm performance (ROA_CNID) remain positive and highly significant. These results support 
our second and fourth hypotheses, that an independent compensation committee or the gender-diverse compensation 
committee strengthens the link between top managers’ pay and firm performance.  
A few studies have also reported that the compensation committee independence is positively associated with the 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance (Conyon & Peck 1998; Kent et al. 2016). However, our findings 
contradict the results of majority of previous studies (e.g., Conyon 1997; Newman & Mozes 1999; Capezio et al. 2011). In 
line with the managerial power theory, our results suggest that an independent compensation committee facilitates the 
objective of designing the optimal compensation contract for top managers’ and that such a committee will pay top 
managers for performance. Regarding the compensation committee’s gender diversity, our results validate the finding of 
previous studies that have reported that women directors may improve corporate internal governance by monitoring the 
top managers’ actions and decisions (e.g., Gul et al. 2008; Adam & Ferreira 2009; Gul et al. 2011). In our study, the 
presence of women on the compensation committee improves the committee’s effectiveness and its ability to design 
optimal contracts for top managers. These findings support the agency theory and managerial power theory which suggest 
that the presence of women directors on the compensation committee improves the committee’s independence and 
objectivity in designing the optimal pay contracts for the top management. Moreover, these findings also support our 
arguments based on the stakeholder theory which suggest that presence of a woman on a firm’s compensation committee 
will result in spending less on top managements’ pay, focusing instead on performance-based compensation.  
Table 5 shows the results as they relate to hypotheses 5 and 6. The coefficient of CNID remains positive in firms with an 
all-male compensation committee and those with at least one female on their compensation committee. Moreover, a Chi2 
test of the difference between the coefficients further assures us that there is no significant difference between CNID 
coefficients. These results do not support our third hypothesis. However, the coefficient of ROA_CNID is insignificant in 
all-male compensation committees and positive and significant in gender-diverse compensation committees, indicating 
that an independent compensation committee is not effective in designing optimal contracts unless it is gender-diverse. 
This finding supports our sixth hypothesis, that the effect of a compensation committee’s independence on the relationship 
between top managers’ pay and firm performance is stronger when the compensation committee is gender-diverse. These 
findings also support the results of Terjesen et al. (2016), who reported that independent directors are more productive in 
the sense of firm performance when the board is gender-balanced. Moreover, these findings reconcile the majority of 
previous of studies that reported no influence of an independent compensation committee on the relationship between top 
managers’ pay and firm performance (e.g., Conyon 1997; Newman & Mozes 1999; Capezio et al. 2011) by providing 
gender diversity as a condition under which independent committees design optimal contracts for top managers. 
The control variables behave in keeping with earlier studies on top managers’ compensation (e.g., Bugeja et al. 2016; 
Kent et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016). Of the corporate governance controls, DUAL, CTENUR, and CCS are consistently 
positive and significant in all models. The positive coefficient of CEO duality and CEO tenure support the managerial 
power argument that managerial power is related to higher compensation for top managers. The positive coefficient CCS 
suggests that a larger compensation committee compensates its top managers more than a smaller committee does. All the 
ownership-structure variables remain significant in all models reported in Table 4. The CSH and SOE remain negative, 
and ISH remains positive. Therefore, ownership by the CEO or the state is negatively associated with top managers’ 
compensation, while institutional ownership is associated with increased compensation. Among the firm economic 
controls, FS remains significantly positive, while BM remains significantly negative in all models. These results support 
the notion that larger firms and firms with high growth opportunities pay more to their top managers.  
To summarize, we find that the presence of female directors on the compensation committee not only limits the top 
managers’ total compensation (e.g., Bugeja et al. 2016) but also strengthens the link between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance. We also find that an independent compensation committee is positively associated with top managers’ total 
compensation and the relationship between top manager’s pay and firm performance (e.g., Conyon & Peck 1998; Kent et 
al. 2016). In addition, we find that an independent compensation committee is more effective in designing optimal 
contracts when it is gender-diverse. Overall, our findings support the managerial power theory and agency theory that an 
independent compensation committee is effective in independently setting top managers’ compensation and that the 
presence of a woman on the compensation committee improves the committee’s effectiveness in setting the top managers’ 
compensation and strengthens the independent directors’ effectiveness.  
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
4.1. Additional analysis (Whether the effect of independent directors and female directors on top managers’ 
compensation varies based on the ownership structure or not?) 
Given the distinct nature of Chinese companies ownership structure, the question arises concerning whether the effect of 
independent directors and female directors on top managers’ compensation varies based on the firm’s ownership structure. 
The ownership structure is highly concentrated in Chinese firms, and the real power in most companies lies with the state 
owners or legal-person owners. Controlling shareholders may elect their preferred delegates on the boards and use them to 
their benefit, sometimes at the cost of minority shareholders (Liu et al. 2014), but both state and legal-person owners have 
distinct management motives. For example, state firms may have social, political, or multiple objectives, such as 
employment growth or gender equality, rather than profit maximization (Conyon & He 2011). In contrast, legal-person 
owners have strong motives for profit maximization and, therefore, strong incentives to monitor the board’s managerial 
activities (Liu et al. 2014).  
As different dominant owners have different motives, we seek to determine whether independent directors and women 
directors on the compensation committee have the same influence on top managers’ compensation under different 
ownership structures. We split our sample into two subsamples: state-owned firms and legal-person owned firms. The 
state subsample includes firms with state ownership but no legal-person ownership, so the state has power over the 
selection of independent directors and female directors. In the legal-person owner subsample, the firms have legal 
ownership but no state ownership, so the legal-person owners have power over the selection of board of directors. Table 6 
portrays the results of the state subsample and the legal-person subsample. 
The coefficient of CFD is insignificant in model 1 for the state subsample, while it is negative and significant for the 
individual subsample in model 3. These results indicate that the presence of women directors on the compensation 
committee limits the top managers’ compensation in legal-person owned firms but not in state owned firms. However, the 
coefficient of ROA_CFD in model 2 and 3 remains positive, indicating that gender-diverse compensation committees 
effectively link top managers’ pay to firm performance in both legal-person owned and state owned firms. The CNID 
coefficient remains positive and significant in both subsamples in models 1 and 3, indicating that independent 
compensation committees increase top managers’ compensation in both types of firms. However, the coefficient of 
ROA_CNID is insignificant in model 2 and significant and positive in model 4, indicating that independent compensation 
committees effectively links top managers’ pay with firm performance in legal-person-controlled firms but not in state-
controlled firms. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the compensation committee’s independence or gender diversity is more effective 
in designing top managers’ compensation in legal-person-controlled firms than it is in state-controlled firms.  
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
4.2. Robustness checks 
4.2.1. Alternative Measure 
To check the robustness of our findings, we use alternative measures for the compensation committee’s gender diversity, 
compensation committee’s independence, and top managers’ compensation. We replace the gender-diversity measures 
with the number of female directors on the compensation committee (FNUM). We replace the compensation committee’s 
independence measure with CINDM and CINDF, where CINDM is dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a higher 
proportion of independent directors on its compensation committee than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. CINDF is 
also a dummy variable that equals 1 if all the compensation committee members are independent directors and 0 
otherwise. In line with earlier studies on top managements’ compensation, we replace our dependent variable TMP with 
CEOP, where CEOP is measured as the log of CEO total cash compensation. For parsimony, we report only the result of 
the moderating effect of these new measures on the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance. 
Models 1 and 2 (Table 7) illustrate the results for the CEOP measure. Similar to the TMP results, the coefficients of ROA_ 
FDUM, ROA_ FPRO, and ROA_CIND remain positive and highly significant for the CEOP models. These results are 
consistent with our previous findings that the compensation committee’s independence or gender diversity strengthens the 
link between top managers’ pay and firm performance. Models 3 and 4 (Table 7) show the results for alternative measures 
of compensation committees’ independence and gender diversity. The coefficient of the interaction variables of the new 
measures of the compensation committee’s gender diversity and independence with firm performance (ROA_ CINDM, 
ROA_ CINDF, and ROA_ FNUM) remain positive and significant, which further validates our previous findings that the 
gender-diverse or independent compensation committee strengthens the link between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance. We also used the Blau index (Blau 1977) and the Shannon index (Shannon 1948) as a comprehensive 
measure of the compensation committee diversity, and our findings remain consistent. For reasons of parsimony, the 
results for Blau index and Shannon index measures are not reported.  
4.2.2. Endogeneity 
There may be the case that our OLS results are misleading due to endogeneity. For example, in some cases, a stronger 
relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance is due to the other characteristics of firms (i.e., due to 
different board structure, ownership structure, and firm economic condition) rather than gender diversity or independence 
of compensation committees. Therefore, these firm characteristics are associated with the stronger relationship between 
top managers’ pay and firm performance. In addition, someone may argue that female presence is an endogenous choice 
variable for the firm, and that firms that are better governed, and put larger emphasis on having optimal compensation 
contracts in place, may also be more likely to appoint women to their boards and to the compensation committee. That is, 
those firms with larger female presence are potentially inherently different from firms with no females, or a low female 
share. To deal with these issues, we follow the related literature (Bugeja et al., 2016; Usman et al., 2018) and use two 
different statistical methodologies (two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching method). 
4.2.2.1. Two-stage least square regression 
Following the Usman et al. (2018) we used the lagged values of compensation committee’s gender-diversity measures as 
instrument variables, then the contemporaneous industry mean of compensation committees gender-diversity measures, 
and finally both lagged values of compensation committee’s gender diversity and the industry mean of compensation 
committee’s gender diversity measures are used as instrument variables. For brevity, we report only the results for the 
CFD and CIND measures in model 5 (Table 7). Again, the interaction variables ROA_CIND and ROA_CFD remain 
significantly positive, indicating that the compensation committee’s independence and gender diversity strengthens the 
relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance. As robustness checks, we used all other measures of 
compensation committees’ gender diversity and independence but for brevity we only report the result of one measure of 
compensation committee gender diversity and independence.  
4.2.2.2. Propensity score matching method 
The propensity-score-matching (PSM) method allows us to control for firms without gender diverse compensation 
committees and without high proportion of independent directors on compensation committee that probable have no 
observable differences in characteristics from those firms with gender diverse compensation committee and with high 
proportion of independent directors on compensation committees. So the companies in each pair of matched companies 
are nearly indistinguishable from one another except for two variables (i.e., compensation committee gender diversity and 
independence).  
For the matching subsample of firms with gender-diverse compensation committees, we followed Bugeja et al. (2016) and 
Usman et al. (2018) in basing our matching on the probability that a firm has at least one woman director on their 
compensation committees (FDUM) based on all control variables (i.e., corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
firm economic control variable), the percentage of women directors on the board and compensation committee 
characteristics. For compensation committees’ independence, matching is based on the probability that there is a greater 
proportion of independent directors in a firm than the sample’s median (CINDM) based on all control variables (i.e., 
corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm economic control variable) and compensation committee size.  
The results of the PSM method are reported in Table 8. The first two models provide the results on the influence of 
compensation committee independence or gender diversity on the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance for the whole matched subsample. Again the interaction variables ROA_FDUM and ROA_ CINDM remain 
positive and significant which further validates the OLS findings reported in Table 4. The last two columns provide the 
results on the influence of the compensation committee’s independence on the link between top managers’ pay and firm 
performance for firms with and without compensation committees’ gender diversity. The coefficient of ROA_CIND 
remains positive and highly significant in model 3 and 4. This result contradicts our findings reported in Table 5. This 
indicates that an independent compensation committee is effective in strengthening the link between top manager’s pay 
and firm performance whether the compensation committee is gender-diverse or not. However, the coefficient of 
ROA_CIND is higher in firms having at least one female director on the compensation committee as compared to all male 
directors committee. Further, the Chi2 test of coefficient difference validates that coefficients are significantly different. 
Taken together, these results also support our sixth hypothesis that the positive impact of the compensation committee’s 
independence on the relationship between top manager’s pay and firm performance is higher in firms having the gender-
diverse compensation committee. 
4.2.3. Further robustness test 
To further confirm our results and to check the possible issue of selection bias, we also applied a two-stage Heckman 
(1976) procedure to investigate the possibility of sample-selection bias. In the first stage, using logit regression we find 
the determinants of compensation committee gender diversity by including all control variables (i.e. corporate 
governance, ownership structure and firm economic controls) as independent variables.  From this stage we calculated the 
inverse mills ratio and included this ratio as an independent variable in our main regression. This mills ratio remains 
insignificant, which indicates that there is no such issue.  
In addition, as we have observations from several years for each company, it may be the case that the observations are not 
sufficiently independent, and our OLS results may be misleading. Therefore, we followed Huber’s (1967) formula, and 
again our main findings remain consistent after clustering standard errors by company.  
Finally, as the study uses the log of top managers’ total cash compensation as the dependent variable (because equity 
compensation is rare in China), as a cleaner test we exclude those few firms that do offer equity compensation before 
retesting our all hypotheses. Again our results remain consistent. For brevity, we do not report the results of two-stage 
Heckman regression and cluster OLS regression. However, the entire robustness test for all alternative measures and 
statistical techniques can be provided on request. 
 [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
5. Summary and conclusion 
Our results indicate that the presence of a woman on a compensation committee increases the committee’s effectiveness in 
objectively setting top managers’ compensation. Gender diversity on a compensation committee not only limits top 
managers’ total compensation but also strengthens the link between top managers’ pay and firm performance. In line with 
Kent et al. (2016), we also find that an independent compensation committee is positively associated with top managers’ 
total compensation and with the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance. In addition, our results 
suggest that the presence of a woman on a compensation committee enhances the positive influence of committee 
independence on the link between top managers’ pay and firm performance. Overall, our results support the managerial 
power theory (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 2004, 2006) by arguing that a compensation committee with 
all male directors may not be sufficiently independent. Moreover, we reconcile the majority of extant studies by providing 
empirical evidence that support the perspectives of agency theory and managerial power theory that an independent 
compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers’ pay and firm performance when it is gender-
diverse. As Terjesen et al. (2016 p. 453) argued, a gender-imbalanced board signals that top managers have power over 
the selection of outside directors. Therefore, there is the possibility that an independent compensation committee with all-
male directors is not truly independent of top managers and cannot tie top managers’ pay to firm performance. Our results 
also support the notion that an independent compensation committee is more effective when it is gender-diverse than 
when it is not. In addition, given the unique ownership structure in China, we investigate whether the effect of 
independent directors and female directors on top managers’ compensation varies based on the firm’s ownership structure. 
We find that an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee is more effective in legal-person-controlled firms 
than it is in state-controlled firms. All of our results remain consistent when we used alternative measures and alternative 
statistical methodologies.  
Our findings have policy implications because of our focus on two recent trends toward recommending an independent 
compensation committee and female directors on the board. Our results accentuate the role of an independent 
compensation committee in designing optimal contracts for top managers. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that 
the presence of a woman on the compensation committee strengthens the committee’s effectiveness in objectively 
determining top managers’ compensation. Our finding supports the recommendations of regulatory bodies around the 
world regarding the compensation committees’ independence and boardroom gender diversity. More specifically, the 
compensation committee’s independence and gender diversity can improve the weak governance structure in China. In 
addition, our findings also provide strong implication for managerial practices by highlighting the important role of 
compensation committee’s gender-diversity and independence in designing the optimal contracts for the top management.  
Our findings are subject to certain limitations. We use data from an emerging economy, so the same question should be 
investigated in developed countries and other developing countries before our results can be generalized. Similar to earlier 
study on the compensation committees’ gender diversity, our study uses data from a country where gender diversity on 
boards is not mandatory. Therefore, the same question should be investigated in an institutional setting where it is 
mandatory to have gender diversity on the board because forced gender diversity on corporate boards may have 
counterproductive results, as compared to voluntary gender diversity. In addition, we consider only top managers’ cash 
compensation because of the unavailability of top managers’ equity compensation information in China. Therefore, an 
opportunity remains to investigate whether a gender-diverse compensation committee leads to a higher proportion of 
equity compensation as part of top managers’ total compensation.  
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Table 1: Measurement of variables  
Abbreviation  Description 
Panel A: top managers’ total pay, firm performance, compensation committee’s independence, and gender 
diversity measures 
TMP 
Defined as the log of the average pay of executive directors’ (including CEOs’) total cash 
compensation. 
CEOP Defined as the log of the CEO’s total cash compensation. 
ROA Measured as return on assets, defined as net profit divided by total assets. 
CIND Defined as the proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee. 
CINDM 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a higher proportion of independent directors on 
the compensation committee than the sample’s median and 0 otherwise. 
CINDF 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if all the compensation committee members are independent 
directors and 0 otherwise. 
FDUMY 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one female director is a member of the compensation 
committee, and 0 otherwise. 
FPRO Defined as the proportion of female directors on the compensation committee. 
FNUM Defined as the number of female directors on the compensation committee. 
Panel B: Corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm economic control variables measurement. 
CDUAL 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO and the chairperson of the board are the same 
person. 
CTENUR Defined as the number of years the CEO has served as CEO of the firm. 
BS Defined as the number of directors on the board. 
BI Defined as the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
CCS Defined as the number of directors on the compensation committee. 
CSH Defined as the percentage of the firm shares held by the CEO. 
ISH Defined as the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. 
SOE 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is affiliated with a central or local government and 0 
otherwise. 
FS Defined as the log of total sales. 
FL Defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
BM Defined as the book value of shareholders’ equity divided by the market value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee, 
and female representation on the board and compensation committee by year 
Year 
No. of 
Firms 
No. of firms 
with female 
director(s) 
on 
boardroom 
(percentage) 
Proportion 
of females 
directors 
on the 
board 
No. of firms with 
female director(s) 
on compensation 
committee 
(percentage) 
Proportion of 
females 
directors on 
compensation 
committee 
Proportion of 
independent 
directors on 
compensation 
committee 
2005 248 157(63.3%) .099 81(32.7%) .109 .633 
2006 340 208(61.2%) .099 107(31.5%) .106 .645 
2007 483 308(63.8%) .107 176(36.4%) .116 .653 
2008 594 380(64.0%) .103 204(34.3%) .112 .654 
2009 800 517(64.0%) .109 299(37.4%) .124 .652 
2010 1032 700(67.8%) .116 412(39.9%) .132 .661 
2011 1349 938(69.5%) .120 534(39.6%) .135 .661 
2012 1575 1120(71.1%) .125 636(40.4%) .141 .666 
2013 1587 1154(72.7%) .129 643(40.5%) .147 .670 
2014 1674 1241(74.1%) .134 691(41.3%) .153 .668 
2015 1369 1034(75.5%) .140 627(45.8%) .167 .672 
Total 11051 7757(68.0%) .116 4410(39.9%) .141 .658 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for total sample (N = 11051) 
Variables  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TMP 7.14 15.62 12.25 0.88 
ROA -48.32 4.84 0.04 0.48 
FDUM 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.49 
FPRO 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.19 
CIND 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.12 
DUAL 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 
CTENUR 0.00 19.00 3.03 2.81 
BS 5.00 26.00 10.17 2.49 
BI 0.20 0.80 0.38 0.07 
CCS 1.00 8.00 3.48 0.99 
CSH 0.00 0.79 0.03 0.10 
ISH 0.00 87.89 7.39 10.29 
SOE 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
FS 9.04 28.67 21.32 1.47 
FL 0.01 96.96 0.49 1.16 
BM 0.00 16.15 0.97 1.03 
The percentage of firms that have female directors on their boards and compensation committees is reported in 
parentheses. The N is small in initial years because compensation committee was not common in Chinese firms in early 
years. For a detailed description of variables, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.TMP 1                
2. FDUM .009 1               
3.FPRO .012 .883** 1              
4.CIND .076** -.044** .013 1             
5.ROA .054** .010 .009 -.002 1            
6.DUAL .108** .018 .036** .012 -.014 1           
7. CTENUR .212** .028** .039** .035** .014 .116** 1          
8.BS -.073** .028** -.015 -.033** -.008 -.093** -.019* 1         
9.BI .161** -.001 .014 .086** .001 .084** .130** -.046** 1        
10.CCS -.012 .130** -.030** -.377** .006 -.113** -.026** .205** -.062** 1       
11. CSH .105** .006 .032** .017 .017 .453** .129** -.111** .104** -.123** 1      
12.ISH .025** .016 .006 -.011 .017 -.030** -.055** .024* -.064** .033** -.063** 1     
13.SOE -.232** -.028** -.066** .055** -.006 -.286** -.139** .190** -.125** .159** -.335** .124** 1    
14.FS .294** -.024* -.050** .069** .045** -.152** .043** .211** .013 .111** -.175** .098** .300** 1   
15.FL -.046** -.010 -.013 -.002 -.468** -.001 -.033** .014 .000 .009 -.054** -.006 .034** -.008 1  
16. BM .023* -.024* -.039** .053** -.018 -.124** -.023* .128** -.028** .070** -.162** 
-
.026** 
.273** .459** .073** 1 
*, ** Correlation is significant at 5% and 1% respectively. For a detailed description of variables see Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of independent or gender diverse compensation committee on top managers pay and top managers pay-
performance link (N = 11051).  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FDUM -.010*(-1.70) - -.038**(-2.47) - 
FPRO - -.024*(-01.67) - -.108***(-2.77) 
CIND .492***(7.63) .492***(7.63) .426***(6.21) .431***(6.28) 
ROA .049***(3.05) .049***(3.05) -1.262***(-2.61) -1.205**(-2.50) 
ROA_ FDUM - - .681***(5.10) - 
ROA_ FPRO - - - 2.061***(5.56) 
ROA_ CIND - - 1.958***(2.70) 1.872***(2.59) 
DUAL .091***(4.84) .091***(4.83) .091***(4.88) .092***(4.90) 
CTENUR .019***(6.67) .019***(6.67) .019***(6.63) .019***(6.63) 
BS -.040***(-13.34) -.040***(-13.35) -.040***(-13.31) -.040***(-13.29) 
BI .911***(8.78) .911***(8.78) .909***(8.77) .911***(8.78) 
CCS .063***(7.88) .062***(7.85) .063***(7.85) .062***(7.83) 
CSH .134(1.61) .134(1.61) .122(1.47) .119(1.43) 
ISH .003***(4.14) .003***(4.13) .003***(4.03) .003***(4.01) 
SOE -.442***(-26.30) -.442***(-26.30) -.437***(-26.01) -.438***(-26.05) 
FS .276***(45.92) .276***(45.91) .272***(44.99) .272***(44.95) 
FL .004(.61) .004(.61) .004(.57) .004(.59) 
BM -.062***(-7.08) -.062***(-7.08) -.056***(-6.42) -.056***(-6.42) 
Industry & year 
dummies 
included included included included 
Constant 6.204***(44.69) 6.207***(44.63) 6.325***(45.00) 6.329***(45.00) 
F-value 81.42*** 81.42*** 79.73*** 79.83*** 
Adjusted R2 33.1% 33.1% 33.3% 33.3% 
N 11051 11051 11051 11051 
*, **,*** coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is TMP and this table demonstrates the results of first four hypotheses. For a detailed description of 
variables see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Impact of independent compensation committee on top managers pay and top manager’s pay 
and pay-performance link for firm with and without women directors on the compensation committee 
 All Males Sample Some Females Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CIND .450***(5.59) .423***(4.93) .589***(5.44) .441***(3.82) 
ROA_ CIND - .790(0.91) - 4.973***(3.68) 
ROA .047***(2.85) -.479(-0.83) .745***(5.52) -2.430***(-2.78) 
DUAL .087***(3.50) .086***(3.48) .080***(2.80) .083***(2.89) 
CTENUR .021***(5.34) .021***(5.35) .017***(4.05) .831***(3.93) 
BS -.042***(-10.54) -.042***(-10.54) -.037***(-8.14) -.037***(-8.08) 
BI .977***(7.22) .975***(7.20) .833***(5.15) .818***(5.06) 
CCS .059***(5.46) .059***(5.45) .065***(5.40) .066***(5.53) 
CSH .249**(2.27) .249**(2.26) .009(0.07) -.003(-0.02) 
ISH .002**(2.56) .002**(2.54) .003***(3.06) .003***(3.02) 
SOE -.469***(-21.38) -.469***(-21.39) -.396***(-14.97) -.397***(-15.04) 
FS .289***(37.37) .289***(37.38) .248***(25.17) .246***(25.04) 
FL .009(1.29) .009(1.30) -.029(-1.21) -.027(-1.11) 
BM -.062***(-5.50) -.061***(-5.48) -.038***(-2.65) -.037**(-2.53) 
Industry & year dummies included  included included included 
Constant 5.289***(13.05) 5.305***(13.07) 6.192***(19.80) 6.307***(20.09) 
F-value 53.16*** 52.39*** 34.25*** 34.03*** 
Adjusted R2 34.48% 34.48% 32.55% 32.75% 
N 6,641 6,641 4,410 4,410 
*, **,*** coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is TMP and this table demonstrates the results of last two 
hypotheses. For a detailed description of variables see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of gender diverse or independent compensation committee on top managers’ pay-
performance link for State controlled firms and Legal-Person controlled firms (additional test) 
 State Subsample Legal-person Subsample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FDUM .018(0.84) -.001(-0.07) -.0464**(-2.47) -.065***(-3.15) 
CIND .560***(6.83) .528***(5.95) .317***(2.95) .201*(1.77) 
ROA .181**(2.23) -.589(-0.73) .0368**(2.42) -1.806***(-3.05) 
ROA_ FDUM - .618***(2.95) - .387**(2.16) 
ROA_ CIND - 1.035(0.86) - 2.767*** (3.11) 
Industry & Year dummies included included included included 
Governance ownership & 
economic controls 
included included included included 
(Constant) 4.97***(12.98) 5.03***(13.11) 5.275***(14.64) 5.396***(14.91) 
F-value 41.49*** 40.42*** 38.83** 37.91*** 
Adjusted R2 31.58% 31.67% 30.81% 30.94% 
N 5,529 5,529 5,522 5,522 
*, **,*** coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is TMP. This table show the results of the question concerning 
whether the effect of an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee varies by ownership 
type. For a detailed description of variables, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of gender diverse or independent compensation committee on top managers’ pay-
performance link using alternative measures of variables (robustness checks)  
 Alternative Measures  2-SLS 
 Model 1 
CEOP 
Model 2 
CEOP 
Model 3 
TMP 
Model 4 
TMP 
Model 5 
TMP 
FDUM -.060***(-4.02) - - - -.065***(-3.11) 
FPRO - -.175***(-4.57) - - - 
FNUM - - -.017(-1.51) -.019*(-1.69) - 
CINDM - - .051***(1.98) - - 
CNFI - - - .115***(3.65) - 
CIND .220***(3.30) .226***(3.38) - - .464***(4.01) 
ROA -1.782***(-3.77) -1.708***(-3.63) .041(2.52) 0.041**(2.55) -1.695***(-3.07) 
ROA_ FDUM .701***(5.35) - - - .638***(4.46) 
ROA_ FPRO - 2.025***(5.55) - -  
ROA_CIND 2.726***(3.84) 2.616***(3.70) .412***(4.01) .440***(4.30) 2.585***(3.12) 
ROA_ FNUM - - - - - 
ROA_ CINDM - - 1.813***(5.26) - - 
ROA_CNFI - - - 1.761***(4.31) - 
Industry & Year 
dummies 
included included included included included 
Governance ownership 
& economic controls 
included included included included included 
(Constant) 
7.670*** 
(56.19) 
7.680*** 
(56.23) 
5.584*** 
(16.16) 
5.547*** 
(16.06) 
7.607*** 
(44.72) 
F-value 62.13*** 62.21*** 79.40*** 79.41*** 3392.05 
Adjusted R2 27.6% 27.6% 33.19% 33.19% 26.96% 
N 11051 11051 11051 11051 8,931 
*, **,*** coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. In first two models the dependent variables is CEOP, while in preceding models the 
dependent variables is TMP. This table demonstrates the results of robustness test of hypotheses 2 and 4. 
For a detailed description of variables, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Impact of compensation committee independence and gender diversity on top managers’ pay-
performance link using propensity score matching method (robustness checks) 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
All Males 
Model 4 
Some Females 
FDUM .053(.111) -.034**(-2.06) - - 
CINDM 0.068*(1.89) - - - 
CIND - .108***(3.32) .562***(4.83) .448***(3.88) 
ROA .737**(2.49) -.073***(-3.03) -2.870***(-2.72) -2.425***(-2.77) 
ROA_ FDUM - .407***(3.08)  - 
ROA_CIND - 2.807***(5.97) 3.778**(2.39) 4.949***(3.65) 
ROA_ CINDM 1.035**(2.29) - - - 
Industry & Year dummies included included included included 
Governance ownership & 
economic controls 
included included included included 
(Constant) 6.463***(10.58) 6.305***(16.38) 4.063***(11.30) 5.507***(15.24) 
F-value 21.35*** 65.69*** 43.57*** 33.45**** 
Adjusted R2 35.05% 33.08% 38.70% 32.49% 
N 2,452 8,768 4,384 4,384 
*, **,*** coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is TMP and this table demonstrates the results of robustness test of 
hypotheses 2, 4 and 6.  For a detailed description of variables see Table 1. 
 
 
 
